With the benefit of the perspective of both sides of the table -having served both as a government official responsible for investment claims and as a private lawyer advising in this field -I can say with confidence that the definition of "investor" and "investment" is the key to making the most of international investment agreements. Why is it the key?
From the perspective of a capital exporting country, the definition identifies who the country's constituents are for purposes of investment policy -who are the categories of persons, industries and groups that will benefit from the investment treaty program.
From the perspective of a capital importing country, the definition identifies who the country's clients are for purposes of investment policy -who are the persons, industries and groups that the country wants to attract in order to increase foreign investment.
From the perspective of investors, the definition identifies how the investment holdings may be structured in order to maximize protection of the investment under investment treaties. This sounds rather like BIT-shopping. And it is -a subject I will return to.
In the lines that follow, I first provide an overview of the definitions of investment and investor in contemporary treaties. I then examine the policy implications of these definitions in the current investment environment.
Overview
Investment treaties are premised on two elemental propositions: foreign investment tends to spur economic development, and fundamental legal protections tend to encourage and promote foreign investment. 1 It is equally elemental that capital is fungible and investment of capital takes a multitude of forms in the world today. In recognition of this reality, the definitions of "investment" in contemporary treaties tend to be broad and open-ended, with a list of specific types of covered investments that is indicative rather than definitive. Recent U.K. treaties define investment as "every kind of asset", introducing the list of specific forms of investment with the indicative phrase "and in particular, though not exclusively . BIT uses a famously circular definition: "investment" means "every asset . . . that has the characteristics of an investment," also followed by an indicative list.
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These broad definitions reflect, I would submit, an effort to accommodate the endless creativity of the capital markets. Put in slightly different terms, the broad definition of investment reflects a desire to encourage foreign investment in all its forms, present and future.
There are, as noted in the Symposium paper on Novel Features in OECD Countries' Recent Investment Agreements, a small minority of treaties that provide for a closed list of defined investmentsthe NAFTA and the Canadian Model BIT are the principal examples. 5 The closed list provided in these treaties is so comprehensive, however, that it is difficult to conceive of an investment covered under the open-list approach that would not be encompassed in the closed lists of these treaties. 6 The broad definition of what constitutes an investment, then, is the first reference point in the landscape of the definitions of investment and investor in contemporary BITs.
The second characteristic of this landscape is an increasing number of treaties that expressly cover indirectly controlled investments. The Canadian, Dutch, French, Swiss and U.S. BITs cover indirectly controlled investments, although through different mechanisms. The Dutch, French and Swiss BITs tend to cover indirect investments through a special definition of "investor" or "national" that encompasses companies controlled by their citizens or by companies organized under their laws. See, e.g., NAFTA art. 1139 ("investment means: (a) an enterprise; (b) an equity security of an enterprise; (c) a debt security of an enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years, but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise; (d) a loan to an enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years, but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise; (e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise; (f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded from subparagraph (c) or (d); (g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes; and (h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under (i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or (ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenues or profits of an enterprise; but investment does not mean, (i) claims to money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another Party, or (ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or (j) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (h); . . . ."). Canadian BITs achieve the same result through a different mechanism: they define "investment" as "every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, . . . ."
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Whether achieved through the definition of "investment" or that of "investor," the effect is clear: investment treaty protection is not lost when multinationals use the common corporate devices of intermediate holding companies and special investment holding companies organized under the laws of a third country.
Many, if not all, of the U.K. and German BITs lack these special definitions, thus leaving it open to argument whether indirectly controlled investments are covered by the treaty's protections.
Two other features, found largely if not exclusively in Canadian and U.S. BITs, bear mention as part of the landscape. The first is protection of pre-establishment investment activity. The protection is effected in part through the definition in U.S. BITs of "investor of a Party" as including "a national or enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making or has made an investment . . . ."
9 Because of this definition, the few substantive obligations in U.S. BITs that apply to "investors of a Party" -national and most-favored-nation treatment -cover activity before the investment is established as well as postestablishment activity.
The second feature of U.S. BITs relevant here is the denial-of-benefits provision. This provision gives the host State the authority effectively to carve out from the definition of "investor" shell companies owned by nationals of a third-country or the host State and companies owned by enemy aliens.
Policy Implications
Having now outlined the landscape of investment and investor in today's treaties, I turn to the policy implications of that landscape. I begin with the most striking implication: although each investment treaty is drafted as a bilateral set of obligations, to comply with those obligations the host State must treat them as obligations erga omnes -obligations owed to every State and every company.
10
This conclusion flows from the fact that, under normal circumstances, host State officials will never know at the time they must take action whether a given company is covered by a given treaty. Where a host State has entered into BITs that cover indirectly controlled investments, there could be between one and 20 or more layers of intermediate holding companies that separate the company the host State officials see and the company that is a covered investor under the treaty. The covered investor could itself, in fact, be an intermediate holding company, with the ultimate parent company publicly traded or controlled by third country nationals. A lower level official reviewing a permit application -just like a minister (2005), art. 1 ("[A]n obligation erga omnes is: (a) an obligation under general international law that a State owes in any given case to the international community, in view of its common values and its concerns for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to take action; or (b) an obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the treaty owes in any given case to all the other States parties to the same treaty, in view of their common values and concern for compliance, so that breach of that obligation enables all these States to take action."), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_01_en.pdf. reviewing a bid proposal of national importance -will not normally have access to information concerning the nationality of intermediate holding companies in the applicant's corporate hierarchy.
Under these circumstances, the only way to comply with the treaty is for the host State to assume that all investors -all companies -are covered by the highest standards of any BIT in force for the State. The reality that foreign capital is highly fungible and the breadth of the definitions of investor and investment thus combine to effectively transform the facially bilateral obligations of the BIT into an obligation that the host State must consider potentially applicable to all investors.
On reflection, this observation may not be so startling for two reasons. First, there is some evidence that this is how at least some States analyze the problem of complying with their BIT obligations. The extensive sets of annexes attached to the new generation of U.S. free trade agreements and BITs require that countries adopting those forms of agreement conduct a rigorous analysis of the country's laws for compliance with the agreement's standards -not with respect to just U.S. investors, but for all potential investors of all nationalities. 11 Second, the object and purpose of investment treaties is, after all, to encourage foreign investment.
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If the country's adherence to BITs serves that purpose and attracts foreign investment, how much should the nationality of that source of investment really matter to the host State -putting aside the special policy cases of domestic investors and enemy aliens addressed by the denial-of-benefits concept.
Where the precise definition of investor and investment really matters, therefore, is not at the stage where the host State seeks to adapt its conduct to its obligations under the treaty. Instead, where the definitions are essential is at the stage where the investor seeks to assert a claim against the State under the treaty. Here the definition of investor delineates who has standing to bring a claim in arbitration. And that is a critical issue for not only for the respondent State, but also for the claimant/investor. Indeed, in the private sector we are seeing more and more multinational corporations adding an analysis of the best BIT protection to their standard checklist of items to consider in making an investment outside the developed world. This emerging phenomenon of "BIT-shopping" should not be surprising. For decades, multinationals have shopped for the jurisdiction with the most advantageous tax treaty with respect to their investments overseas. In many emerging markets, political risk for long-term investments outweighs tax considerations in importance. There is substantial potential benefit to an investor, in such markets, of a neutral international arbitration tribunal applying international investment standards rather than local courts applying local law. Given this reality, the emergence of a new industry of "BITshopping" is only natural.
Indeed, the emergence of this industry suggests that, perhaps for the first time, BITs really are beginning to encourage and promote foreign investment in the way they were intended to do. My own perception, based on anecdotal evidence, is that until the early years of this decade BIT negotiators in 
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 31 (1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
OECD countries were more successful in signing BITs than in making their investor communities aware of these treaties. It is only in recent years, with the controversial NAFTA cases that have brought investment treaties into the eye of the general public, that multinational corporations have begun to become more widely aware of investment treaties and increase investment in explicit reliance on them.
It is ironic that the notoriety of investment treaty arbitration may prove to be the key, in the future, to achieving the treaties' potential to stimulate foreign investment.
